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Extraterritorial Application of Federal
Labor Laws: Congress's Flawed
Extension of the ADEA
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) make foreign investments to develop
foreign markets, acquire tariff benefits or other forms of protection,
obtain cost advantages, and procure raw materials.' These efforts result
in a flow of people, goods, capital, and information across national
boundaries.2 Multinational enterprises raise standards of living in
underdeveloped countries,3 and help create friendly economic and
political partners for their home countries.
4
The prosperity and employment opportunities delivered by MNEs,
however, may be coupled with economic domination.5 Multinationar
corporations may also have the capacity to operate outside the reach of
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California, Irvine; J.D., 1987, University of San Diego. The author is an associate
with the firm Sparber, Ferguson, Naumann & Ponder, San Diego, California. The
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1. Smith, The Multinational Corporation: Shadow and Substance [hereinafter Shadow
and Substance], in MULTINATIONALS, UNIONS, AND LABOR RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES 32 (R. Banks &J. Stieber eds. 1977) [hereinafter Banks & Stieber]. See
generally Vagts, Multinational Corporations and International Guidelines, 18 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 463 (1981).
2. Smith, supra note 1, at 37-38.
3. See, e.g., Madigan, The Applicability of U.S. Employment Laws Abroad: A Legal and
Practical Approach, 4 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 319, 320 (1978).
4. Id.
5. See Model, The Politics of Private Foreign Investment, 45 FOREIGN AFF. 639, 647
(1967). Model stated:
Too often, the U.S. branches and subsidiaries constitute a sort of techno-
logical enclave-foreign-owned, foreign-managed, and foreign-directed-in
an economy that remains essentially primitive. [S]ome less-developed coun-
tries believe that these enterprises have done less than they could or should
to foster.., a broad and balanced economy. They want the industries that
foreign investment has brought to them. But they also want to integrate
them with their own economies. They want the business policies of U.S.
branches and subsidiaries to be in harmony with national economic, social,
and political objectives. They want their own nationals to participate in the
ownership, to provide executives and technicians and to have a significant say
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any one nation's jurisdiction. 6 From the view of sovereign governments,
"this presumed capacity becomes a critical problem when the global
reach is used . . . [to circumvent] the policies of particular nations." 7
Accordingly, some countries "extend the extraterritorial reach of their
national jurisdictions, particularly those that see their national policies
frustrated by multinational corporations.' '
The use of extraterritorial jurisdiction may create political
problems. 9 One nation's unwarranted extraterritorial actions may
intrude into another's domestic affairs, thereby challenging the other
nation's sovereignty.10 The United States mandates extraterritorial
in the direction of foreign-owned enterprises. These countries are not asking
too much, and they will not be satisfied with less.
Id. In addition, MNEs choose particular host countries not because they desire to aid
in economic development, but for profit-motivated reasons. It is, therefore, not
unlikely that they
will push constantly, everywhere they operate, toward the lowest attainable
level of social responsibility; the international transfers they seek will be
those that are the least burdensome to them and the most disadvantageous to
their workers. They will try to play off national groups of workers against
each other in mutually destructive competition for employment opportunities
that undermines existing labor standards and retards improvement of stan-
dards.
Weinberg, Multinationals and Unions as Innovators and Change Agents, in Banks &
Stieber, supra note 1, at 104.
The United Nations has given frequent attention to persistent complaints from
developing countries about the conduct of MNEs. See Draft, U.N. Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 7) at 12, Annex II, U.N. Doc.
E/C.10/1983/S/5/Rev. 1 (1983). The United Nations has recognized "the need for
the establishment of appropriate norms-both national and international-to con-
tain or eliminate any negative aspects of the operations of transnational corporations
and to harmonize their activities with the development objectives of the countries in
which they operate." Statement by the Secretary-General to the Commision [on Transnational
Corporations] at its 7th Meeting, on 17 March 1983, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 7) at 34,
Annex VI, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/1983/S/5/Rev. 1.
6. Gotlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspective, 5 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 449,
451 (1983); see also Corcoran, The Trading with the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian
Corporation, 14 McGILL L.J. 174 (1968). In instances where multinationals manufac-
ture goods that are heavily regulated by the nation having jurisdiction over the par-
ent company, that nation will likely pressure the parent to ensure compliance by all
its international subsidiaries. This avenue "avoid[s] the appearance of an invasion of
jurisdictional sovereignty, inducing [foreign] compliance by pressure on United
States parents." Id. at 206. But see Model, supra note 5, at 646 ("An American com-
pany with direct investments in a foreign country is subject to the laws of the United
States as well as those of the country in which it operates. It has, therefore, a dual
loyalty.").
7. Gotlieb, supra note 6, at 451.
8. Id.; see, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
9. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act of 1979 Under
International and American Law, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1308 (1983).
10. Id. at 1308-10, 1315-21. For example, the Soviet pipeline sanctions of 1982
placed severe restrictions on American-based multinationals trading with the Soviet
Union, their overseas subsidiaries, as well as foreign corporations receiving American
goods or producing goods under contract from American companies. See id. at 1309.
Many European nations refused to tolerate the sanctions' encroachment on sover-
eign jurisdiction and ordered their companies not to comply with the directive, even
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application of its law in such areas as antitrust,1 1 securities regulation,12
in the face of swift penalties. Id. at 1309-10. The result was a flood of international
litigation involving the validity of the United States' extraterritorial assertion. See
generally Atwood, The Export Administration Act and the Dresser Industries Case, 15 LAw &
POL'Y INV'L Bus. 1157 (1983); Marcus, Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The President's Authority
to Impose Extraterritorial Controls, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1163 (1983); Zaucha, The
Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls, 15 LAw &
POL'Y IN 'L Bus. 1169 (1983).
11. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ I note, 6a, 45(a)(3) (1982);
see also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706,
714 (1962) ("A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign com-
merce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because
part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries," where "the conspir-
acy was laid in the United States .. ., respondents are not insulated by the fact that
their conspiracy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign government."); Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1979)
("Neither the [Sherman Antitrust] Act nor its legislative history gives any clear indi-
cation of the scope of the extraterritorial jurisdiction conferred ... ; however, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that 'foreign commerce' applies to importing,
exporting, and other commercial transactions between the United States and a for-
eign country. Acts and agreements occurring outside the territorial boundary of the
United States that adversely and materially affect American trade are not necessarily
immune from United States antitrust laws.") (footnote omitted); Pacific Seafarers,
Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("It is plain that
where American foreign commerce is affected foreigners may be held under our anti-
trust laws for restraints thereon. It is also significant ... that the trade not only has
significant contacts and nexus with the United States but also is the province of
American concerns.") (footnotes omitted); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F.
Supp. 1138 (N.D. Il. 1979) (order compelling discovery production against all but
two defendants, acting in concert to violate the antitrust provisions of the Sherman
Act for documents located in foreign countries). But see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986) ("Respondents cannot recover antitrust
damages based solely on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because
American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations'
economies.") (emphasis added). See generally Hood, The Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws: A Selective Bibliography, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765
(1982).
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. III
1985); Securities Exchanges Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1982 & Supp. III
1985); see also Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1977)
("[T]he fact that an allegedly improper transaction occurred outside the United
States or involved parties other than United States citizens has been held not to
defeat subject-matter jurisdiction [of the Securities Act], where the securities
involved in the transaction were registered and listed on a national exchange and the
effect of the foreign transaction adversely affected buyers, sellers and holders of
those securities.") (citiations omitted); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515,
524 (8th Cir. 1973) ("[S]ubject-matterjurisdiction attaches whenever there has been
significant conduct with respect to the alleged violations in the United States. And
this is true even though the securities are foreign ones that had not been purchased
on an American exchange. Thus, the essential issue is whether the defendants' con-
duct in the United States was of such significance to subject them to the jurisdiction
of the District Court.") (citations omitted); Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (allegedly improper foreign securities transactions must meet either
the objective territorial principle, subjective territorial principle, or the impact test
before such transaction can have sufficient connection or interest with United States
for American securities laws to attach). For a discussion of § 30(b) of the Securities
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and export control,' 3 justifying this reach on several policy grounds,
ranging from protecting national security interests to regulating domes-
tic business. 14
United States labor laws, however, have generally been an excep-
tion to extraterritorial application. 15 This policy recognizes the legiti-
macy of local control over employment relationships within a foreign
sovereign's territorial boundaries.' 6 In 1984, however, Congress devi-
ated from this policy when it amended the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (the ADEA), 17 extending the statute's reach beyond
the territorial limits of the United States, thereby protecting U.S. citi-
zens working abroad from arbitrary age discrimination.18 The ADEA
binds all U.S. employers, including U.S. citizens, U.S. corporations, and
foreign corporations under the control of U.S. interests. 19 Whereas,
several courts previously refused to apply the pre-amendment ADEA
extraterritorially in the absence of congressional intent,20 the courts
Exchange Act of 1934 and extraterritoriality, see Loss, Extraterritoriality in the Federal
Securities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 305 (1979).
13. Export-Import Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 82, 635, 635a-1 to a-3, 635d-g, 42
U.S.C. § 2153e-1 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15
U.S.C. §§ 4001-21 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C.
app. § 2401 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14. Jennings, The Proper Reach of TerritorialJurisdiction: A Case Study of Divergent Atti-
tudes, 2 GA.J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 35, 37 (Supp. 2, 1972) ("From the point of view of the
United States any state has a right to defend its own economy from invasion by for-
eign businesses that do not conform to the standards and practices required by
United States law.").
15. See infra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.
16. Id.
17. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984 § 802, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(0)(1),
623(g), 630(f), 631(c) (Supp. III 1985). President Reagan signed the legislation on
Oct. 9, 1984. 130 CONG. REC. D1331 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984). The purpose of the
ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers
and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION
715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 (1965).
18. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
20. See Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1453 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd,
750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1251
(D. NJ. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
Zahourek involved a 43-year-old accountant who, at the time of his employment
termination in March, 1981, was a U.S. citizen working for defendant company in
Honduras. Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated after requesting a transfer back to
the United States. In affirming the district court's dismissal of his ADEA action, the
Tenth Circuit held that "the denial of a transfer within the company of an employee
working in a foreign country is not covered by the ADEA" because even if remotely
involving the United States, at the time of the request the "work place" at which
plaintiff's services were being performed was not within U.S. jurisdiction. Zahoureh,
750 F.2d at 829.
Cleary was the first definitive statement regarding the non-applicability of the
ADEA to U.S. citizens employed outside of the country by American employers. The
case involved a 64-year old plaintiff who was terminated from his position in England
Vol. 21
1988 Extraterritorial Labor Law
must now resolve whether the post-amendment ADEA applies
extraterritorially.
Notwithstanding its noble intent, the 1984 ADEA amendment rep-
resents poor legislating. It verges on legal imperialism-the unilateral
act of an economically and politically powerful nation applying its laws
to conduct abroad, regardless of other nations' interests. By pushing
American principles beyond the limits of enforcement, the amendment
has unfortunate legal and practical implications.
This Article questions the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor
standards in general, and, in particular, the wisdom of the 1984 amend-
ment extending coverage of the ADEA to overseas conduct. The Article
first surveys the bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It then analyzes
the ADEA amendment's legislative history, which suggests an absence of
clear congressional intent to apply the amendment extraterritorially.
The Article evaluates both the legal and practical international implica-
tions of the ADEA amendment in light of past extraterritorial regulatory
efforts. Finally, this Article argues that the United States should not
afford extraterritorial effects to protective labor legislation.
I. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Federal Law
A. Origins and Development
Several U.S. laws operate extraterritorially. 2 1 Although the extraterrito-
in June, 1979. Although the district court was troubled by the lack of any "valid
policy reason why this country's laws against age discrimination should not apply to
American citizens employed by American companies abroad," it nonetheless dis-
missed plaintiff's claim. Cleary, 555 F. Supp. at 1263. It found no merit in plaintiff's
claim that a sufficient nexus to the United States was gained by the U.S. parent com-
pany's issuance of his termination order: "Where the decision may have taken place
is of no consequence." Id.
Courts have reviewed other cases on appeal subsequent to the 1984 ADEA amend-
ment, but because the allegedly improper termination occurred prior to the enact-
ment of the amendment, the dismissal of the claims was nevertheless affirmed on
appeal. See, e.g., DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 377 (N.D.
Tex. 1985), aft'd, 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that the 1984 ADEA
Amendment redefined the term "employee" to include U.S. citizens employed abroad,
and that "[i]f Congress found it necessary to extend the coverage of the ADEA to
foreign-employed United States citizens, the Statute's reach must not ordinarily have
gone that far.") (emphasis in original); Pfeiffer v. Wm. WrigleyJr. Co., 573 F. Supp.
458 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 755 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The weight to be given
an amendment in interpreting the original statute is a vexing question ... the legisla-
tive history of the 1984 amendment leaves totally obscure whether the amendment
was meant to change the law, to state more clearly the original meaning of the law, or
perhaps just to limit the extraterritorial application of the Act [to countries whose
similar laws do not conflict]."); Wolf v. J.I. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 867 (E.D.
Wis. 1985) ("Where legislation creates entirely new substantive rights where none
had previously existed, courts, in order to avoid interference with antecedent rights,
have refused to apply the legislation retroactively.").
21. Examples include the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 1-7 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985); the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78m, 78ff
(1982 & Supp. III 1985); the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401
(1982 & Supp. III 1985); the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. 1-6, 7-39,
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riality controversy developed primarily in the context of economic legis-
lation, the policy considerations and jurisdictional theories apply equally
to labor law.2 2
1. Jurisdiction Based on Territoriality
Three basic theories support judicial jurisdiction at home and abroad:
territoriality, objective territoriality, or the "effects" principle, and
nationality. 23 The territoriality theory grants a sovereign jurisdiction
over all conduct that occurs within its borders. 24 Physical control over
the geographical area, not the character or effect of the conduct, creates
the basis for jurisdiction. 25
Chief Justice Marshall described the territoriality principle as early
as 1812:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restric-
tion, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that
power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation
within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation
itself.
2 6
Prior to 1945, U.S. courts generally used the territoriality principle to
limit their power when applying federal law. The leading application of
this principle occurred in the 1909 case of American Banana Co. v. United
41-44 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); the Export Trading Company Act of
1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. III 1985); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1982 & Supp. III 1985); the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). For background information, see generally Note,
"The NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive Order, 30 BUFFALO L. REV.
611 (1981) (examining the extraterritorial application of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969); Note, The Criminalization of American Extraterritorial Bribery: The
Effect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 645 (1981)
(analyzing the extraterritorial application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act);
Note, Discretion and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission: The Need to Assess Foreign Environ-
mental Effects of American Nuclear Exports, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 477 (1983) (examining the
extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental law).
22. See infra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 10 (1965); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 402 comments c,
d, e (Tent. Final Draft 1985).
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 10-25 (1965); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 402 com-
ment c (Tent. Final Draft 1985).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 10-25 (1965); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 402 com-
ment c (Tent. Final Draft 1985).
26. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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Fruit Co.2 7 The Supreme Court held that U.S. antitrust laws failed to
extend to American companies engaging in allegedly monopolistic con-
duct in a foreign country. 28 In American Banana, the plaintiff and the
defendant, both American corporations involved in the banana trade,
became embroiled in a dispute over the defendant's acts in Central
America. 29 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, found that American
courts could not apply U.S. antitrust laws to actions occurring in other
nations.3 0 Holmes based his opinion on the territoriality principle:
[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done.... For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to
lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than
those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but
would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, con-
trary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly
might resent.
The foregoing consideration would lead in case of doubt to a con-
struction of any statute . . . as confined in ... effect to the territorial
limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.
3 1
Holmes then cited a line of authority, holding that "[a]ll legislation is
prima facie territorial." '3 2
2. Jurisdiction Based on Objective Territoriality: The "Effects" Principle
The United States adopted the objective, or "effects" basis for jurisdic-
tion in 1945.33 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, in deciding United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),3 4
questioned the soundness of American Banana's territorial principle. The
defendant, Alcoa, had organized a Canadian corporation through which
it joined a Swiss aluminum cartel that controlled the amount of alumi-
num delivered to the United States, in violation of the Sherman Act.
3 5
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, stated that the federal
courts held jurisdiction over the defendant.3 6 Judge Hand found the
27. 213 U.S. 347 (1909); see also Picciotto,Jurisdictional Conflicts, International Law
and the International State System, 11 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 11, 16-17 (1983).
28. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 348.
29. Id. at 354-55.
30. Id. at 354-56.
31. Id. at 356-57.
32. Id. at 357.
33. For a history of the development of the objective territorial principle, see
generally J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 269-72 (8th ed.
1977).
34. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also Gerber, Beyond Balancing International Law
Restraints on the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALEJ. INT'L L. 185, 198-200 (1984); Picci-
otto, supra note 27, at 18-19.
35. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44; see also Gerber, supra note 34, at 198-200; Picciotto,
supra note 27, at 18.
36. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444; see also Gerber, supra note 34, at 198-200; Picciotto,
supra note 27, at 18.
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domestic effects of the foreign conduct, rather than its situs, control-
ling.37 If conduct had "intended and actual" or "substantial and fore-
seeable" effects within the state, then domestic jurisdiction applied.3 8
Judge Hand reasoned that "any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not with its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has
consequences within its borders which the state reprehends. ' '39
In 1976, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals modified the Alcoa
effects principle in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A. 40
Timberlane established a "comity" or "balancing of interests"
approach.4 1 Under this analysis, "the court weighs the relative interests
of the United States against those of other states affected by a particular
exercise of U.S. jurisdiction." 4 2 The Timberlane court listed a number of
factors to be considered in applying the balancing test.43 Although
commentators have criticized the Timberlane rule,4 4 a number of courts
37. SeeAlcoa, 148 F.2d at 444; see also Gerber, supra note 34, at 198-200; Picciotto,
supra note 27, at 18-19.
38. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44; see also Gerber, supra note 34, at 198-200.
39. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. The effects principle does not require conduct to take
place within the United States for federal jurisdiction to lie. This conflicts with the
principles espoused by Marshall and Holmes. See supra notes 23-32 and accompany-
ing text; Gerber, supra note 34, at 199. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 comment d (1965) (effects and territorial
principles produce mutual jurisdiction).
Much of the world community criticized Alcoa and the effects principle. Some
countries viewed the effects doctrine as akin to "imperialism" and chose not to rec-
ognize the doctrine. Gordon, Extraterritorial Application of United States Economic Law:
Britain Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAw. 151, 153 (1980); Gotlieb, supra note 6, at 456;
Picciotto, supra note 27, at 11. For a sampling of views, see INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA-
TION REPORT OF FIFTY-FOURTH CONFERENCE 151-246 (1970). The drafters of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States also attempted
to modify Judge Hand's test, limiting its application to crimes and torts. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965). For
decisions limiting the reach of Alcoa, see Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas &
Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666
F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Gordon, supra, at 158.
40. 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976), on remand, 574 F.Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
41. See Gerber, supra note 34, at 185, 203-09.
42. Id. at 185. The court may not assert extraterritorial jurisdiction when "the
interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for
restraint too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion ofjurisdiction." Timberlane,
549 F.2d at 609; see also Gerber, supra note 34, at 185 n.4.
43. These factors include: the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy; the
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the location or principal place of business
of corporations; the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance; the relative significance of effects on the United States as com-
pared with those elsewhere; the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce; the foreseeability of such effect; and the relative impor-
tance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with
conduct abroad. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614; see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Am., 749 F.2d 1378, 1384-86 (9th Cir. 1984).
44. Commentators who favor principles of territoriality have criticized Timberlane
and the comity test. Gerber, supra note 34, at 185-86, 205-06; Griffin, Possible Resolu-
tions of International Disputes Over Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L.
Vol. 21
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have adopted the Timberlane rule.4 5
3. Jurisdiction Based on Nationality
Nationality is a third basis of jurisdiction. Applicable to both natural
and juridical persons, 46 this theory permits a sovereign to regulate the
activities of its overseas nationals and corporations. 4 7 Like territoriality,
nationality is a discrete and independent basis for jurisdiction. 48 For
instance, the nationality theory is the jurisdictional basis for an array of
French, German, and British criminal statutes or codes. 49 Similarly, in
279, 294-96 (1982). Opponents of the comity test criticize the test for, inter alia,
being too political, contrary to normative international law, and too amorphous and
uncertain. Gerber, supra note 34, at 294-96.
45. See Indus. Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. Ltd., 671 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007, aff'd on remand, 704 F.2d
785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc.,
661 F.2d 864, 869, 871 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1981); Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp, 595 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 (3d Cir. 1979); see also 1 J.
ATwoOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 6.11, at 163
(1981) ("the Timberlane approach ... will be influential if not controlling in foreign
commerce litigation for some time to come").
In the antitrust area, Congress codified existing definitions of the effects test as
developed by the federal courts. Thus, Congress requires that the alleged conduct
have a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S. commerce in
order for a claimant to maintain an action under U.S. antitrust laws. See Export Trad-
ing Company Act of 1982 § 402, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45(a) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985)
(excluding from the reach of the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts con-
duct having no "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on U.S.
domestic commerce, import, commerce, or the export opportunities of a U.S.
national); H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1982) (The intent of the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 was to clarify, not change, the prevailing judi-
cial standard).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 10, 26-32 (1965); RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 com-
ment e (Tent. Final Draft 1985). The nationality of a corporation is that of the state
under whose law it is organized. Id. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 27 comment c (1965) (conflicting theories of
corporate nationality include the location of its principle place of business, the siege
social selected by the corporation, or the nationality of its controlling shareholders).
47. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 402 comment b (Tent.
Final Draft 1985).
48. Id. For instance, "the same conduct or activity may provide a basis for exer-
cise ofjurisdiction both by the territorial state and by the state of nationality of the
actor." Id.
49. See, e.g., D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 898 (2d ed. 1970) ("In 1829
... Parliament enacted that murder or manslaughter committed 'whether within the
King's Dominions or without' was triable in England...."); C.P. art. 9 (1930) (Italian
courts have jurisdiction over crimes committed by Italian nationals outside Italian
territory); INDIA PEN. CODE § 4 (3d ed. Raju 1965) (India's criminal laws apply to all
Indian nationals beyond Indian territory); C. PR. PEN., art. 689 (Dalloz 1966) (French
nationals can be convicted for serious crimes even when committed abroad); STGB
§ 3 (German penal law applies to German nationals abroad) and § 4 (German penal
law even applies to individuals acquiring citizenship after committing criminal act);
see also L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 445 n.2 (1980). For American statutory uses of nationality, see 18
U.S.C. § 2381 (1982) (American citizens guilty for treasonous acts committed
"within the United States or elsewhere .... ); 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1982) (Punishment
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the United States, the nationality theory provides the jurisdictional
underpinning for the 1984 ADEA amendment.50
Nationality "has long been a recognized basis which will support
the exercise ofjurisdiction by a state over persons." 51 The United States
Supreme Court, for instance, has recognized the nationality principle in
cases involving trademark infringement and unfair competition, 52 fed-
eral taxation, 53 and subpoenas issued by U.S. courts.5 4
B. Extraterritoriality and U. S. Labor Standards
The United States has developed a system of employment and labor-
management relations standards protecting both the individual worker
and workers covered by collective bargaining relationships. 55 Congress
derives its authority to pass such laws from the commerce clause and the
contracts clause.56
for unauthorized attempts to influence a foreign government's relationship with the
United States by "any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be .... ).
50. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a), 98
Stat. 1767, 1792 (1984).
51. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
52. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (under Lanham Trademark
Act, federal court has jurisdiction over American corporation committing acts of
trademark infringement in a foreign country); American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice
Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal court has power to hear
trademark infringement case where ultimate sale of goods by American corporation
occurred in Saudi Arabia); Branch v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th
Cir. 1944) (American corporation enjoined from marketing phony "diploma mill"
correspondence courses in Latin America: "Congress has the power to prevent
unfair trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the United States, although
some of the acts are done outside the territorial limits of United States"). But see
Comment, A General Theory ofJurisdiction in Trademark Cases, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 611, 637-38 (1986) (arguing that in Steele, the Supreme Court would not have
found a sufficient nexus if jurisdiction were based on nationality alone).
53. Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54-56 (1924) (rejecting the contention that con-
gressional power to impose a tax on a U.S. citizen only exists where the person
receiving the income, and the property from which income is received, are within
U.S. territorial limits).
54. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) (citizen of United States
residing abroad is still bound by U.S. laws applicable to his situation; therefore, when
testimony of a citizen abroad is needed in a criminal case, the American court may
subpoena him).
55. See generally W. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1986); C. MOR-
RIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (1983).
56. Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution declares, "No state shall
... pass any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Article I, section 8, clause 3 states, "The Congress shall have the Power to ... regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the
Indian tribes." Id. § 8, cl. 3.
Under the authority of the commerce clause, for example, Congress enacted the
Fair Labor Standards Act to prevent manufacturers from using interstate commerce
as a means for distributing goods produced under substandard labor conditions.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The Court reasoned that jurisdiction is based on
"[t]he fundamental principle.., that the power to regulate commerce is the power to
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United States courts typically have not applied the territoriality
principle to labor laws absent express provisions to the contrary. 57 The
courts base this policy on the assumption that Congress intended labor
laws to address domestic conditions.5 8
The 1948 Term of the Supreme Court highlighted the intellectual
struggle regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S. labor laws.
The Court first permitted such extraterritorial application,59 then
reversed its position later that year in a second, unrelated decision.
60
The first decision, Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,6 1 involved the mini-
mum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standard
Act of 1938 (the FLSA). 62 The Supreme Court addressed whether the
FLSA applied to work performed on a Bermuda military base which the
United Kingdom leased to the United States.6 3 In a five-to-four deci-
sion, the Court construed the term "possession" to find that Congress
intended that the FLSA apply to employer-employee relations in foreign
territory under lease for military bases. 64 Justice Reed, writing for the
majority, concluded: "It is difficult to formulate a boundary to [the
Act's] coverage short of areas over which the power of Congress
extends, by our sovereignty or by voluntary grant of the authority by the
sovereign lessor to legislate upon maximum hours and minimum
wages." 65
In dissent, Justice Jackson attacked the majority for extending the
statute's reach on technical grounds without fully considering the deci-
sion's impact on foreign relations or labor conditions in Bermuda.
6 6
Jackson argued for clear evidence by Congress before giving the law
enact 'all appropriate legislation' for its 'protection and advancement'...." NLRB,
301 U.S. at 36-37.
57. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hildago, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (NLRA does not
apply to foreign boats in U.S. ports); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286
(1949) (eight-hour law does not apply abroad); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.,
555 F. Supp. 1251, 1262-63 (D. NJ. 1983), aff'd, 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
58. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285.
59. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
60. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285. Justice Frankfurter explained his own attitude
toward this unusual switch: "Because the decision in Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
335 U.S. 377, was one of statutory interpretation, I would feel bound by it were it not
still open because rendered at this Term." Id. at 291.
61. 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
63. Vermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 377.
64. Id. at 390.
65. Id. at 389. Congress effectively overruled Ilermilya-Brown in its 1957 amend-
ment to the FLSA, which prohibits extraterritorial application of U.S. minimum wage
and maximum hour standards. 29 U.S.C. § 213(f) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 987,
85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1756, 1758
("It is the [Committee on Labor and Public Welfare's] view that the fundamental
purposes which the [FLSA] is designed to serve will not be furthered by the applica-
tion of the act to geographical areas within a foreign country.").
66. ermilya-Brown, 335 U.S. at 397. The majority disregarded a State Depart-
ment communication requesting that the court refrain from expansively construing
the statute. Id. at 401 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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extraterritorial application. 6 7 Applying a statute extraterritorially
"should be deliberately and consciously done by Congress, in particular
matters and with particular regard to local conditions, and perhaps after
consultation with [foreign] authorities."'6 8
Four months after Vermilya-Brown, Justice Jackson's viewpoint pre-
vailed when the Court ruled that the Contract Work Standards Act, the
"Eight Hour Law," did not apply to a contract between the U.S. govern-
ment and a private contractor for work performed in the Middle East.69
Basing its decision primarily on the absence of congressional intent, the
Court also discussed issues of international comity. 70 Justice Reed, for
the majority, stated:
There is no language in the Eight Hour Law, here in question, that gives
any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage beyond
places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure
of legislative control. There is nothing brought to our attention indicat-
ing that the United States had been granted by the respective sovereign-
ties any authority, legislative or otherwise, over the labor laws or customs
of Iran or Iraq. 7 1
The Court reached its decision even though the provisions of the Eight
Hour Law were utterly "indistinguishable in effect" from the FLSA pro-
visions at issue in Vermilya-Brown.72
The Supreme Court also has denied extraterritorial application of
the National Labor Relations Act (the NLRA). 73 In two maritime
cases, 74 the Court refused to apply the Taft-Hartley amendments to the
NLRA to foreign ships in American waters. 75 Citing ambiguous statu-
tory language, the Court noted that "[flor us to run interference in such
a delicate field of international relations there must be present the
67. Id at 408. Dicta in Jackson's dissent, however, suggests he was more con-
cerned by the Court's construction of "possession" than he was by extraterritorial
effect in general:
It would not concern the United Kingdom, or the Colony of Bermuda, if the
United States should require its contractors to pay overtime, upon any
assumptions which do not imply a possession adverse to theirs. But I do
think it will cause understandable anxiety if this Court does it by holding, as a
matter of law, that the leased areas are possessions of the United States, like
those we govern to the exclusion of all others.
Id. at 408-09.
68. Id. at 397-98.
69. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
70. Id. at 285.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 292-93 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Indeed, the Court paraphrased an
advisory opinion by the United States Attorney General, effectively adopting the
rationale of the Jackson dissent in Connell. Id. at 286.
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
74. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957); see also Currie, Flags
of Convenience, American Labor, and the Conflict of Laws, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 34; Com-
ment, Foreign Ships in American Ports: The Question of NLRBJurisdiction, 9 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 50 (1975).
75. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 18; Benz, 353 U.S. at 144.
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affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed." '76
These cases show that courts refrain from extraterritorial applica-
tion of labor laws unless expressly authorized by Congress. The courts
recognize that labor laws by their nature trigger concerns regarding
international relations, comity, and administration.
H. The ADEA Amendment
The purpose of the ADEA is to protect citizens from arbitrary age dis-
crimination and "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age." 77 The ADEA forbids age discrimination in
the employment of individuals between the ages of forty and seventy. 78
The Act applies to every employer engaged in interstate commerce who
employs twenty or more employees.79 The definition of an "employer"
includes states and other political subdivisions, labor organizations, and
employment agencies.80
Pre-amendment ADEA cases held that Congress did not intend to
apply the Act to overseas conduct.8 1 Rather, by incorporating the
enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the ADEA,
Congress intended to exclude the foreign work environment from
coverage.8 2
76. Benz, 353 U.S. at 147; see also McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19 (quoting Benz). The
extraterritorial application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 remains
unresolved due to conflicting lower federal court opinions. See Boureslan v.
ARAMCO, 653 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Tex 1987) (rejecting the extraterritorial applica-
tion of Title VII due to its legislative history); Bryant v. International Schools Serv-
ices, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D. N.J.), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir.
1982) (construing the language of Title VII to protect Americans working outside the
United States from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or natural
right); see also Kirschner, The Extraterritorial Application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
34 LAB. LJ. 394 (1983).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). Another purpose of the ADEA is "to help employ-
ers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." Id.
78. Id. § 631 (a).
79. Id. § 630(b). Note, however, that to fall within the definition of "employer," a
person must have employed twenty or more workers "in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id.
80. Id. However, "employer" does not include the U.S. government or "a corpo-
ration wholly owned by the Government of the United States." Id.
81. See supra note 20.
82. Section 7(b) of the ADEA states that:
The provisions of this Act shall be enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies, and procedures provided in section 11(b), 16 (except for subsec-
tion (1) thereof) and, 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended
(29 U.S.C. 211(b), 216, 217) [29 U.S.C.S. §§ 211(b), 216, 217], and subsec-
tion (c) of this section. Age Discrimination Employment Act, P.L. 90-202,
§ 7(b), 81 Stat. 602, 604 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 626(b)
(1982)).
Section 16(d) of the FLSA, cited above by the ADEA, provides that "no employer
shall be subject to any liability or punishment.., on account of his failure to comply
with any provision.., of such Act (1) with respect to work... performed in a work-
place to which the exemption in section 213(o of this title is applicable." 29 U.S.C.
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A. Legislative History of the ADEA Amendment
On November 18, 1983, Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman of
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources' Subcommittee on
Aging, introduced Senate Bill No. 2167, extending the ADEA's coverage
to U.S. citizens employed abroad.83 On April 26, 1984, Senator
Grassley introduced Senate Bill No. 2603, the Older American Act
Amendments of 1984, to reauthorize the Act and to incorporate virtu-
ally all of Senate Bill No. 2167.84 On May 24, 1984, the Senate passed
Senator Grassley's reauthorization bill, along with the amendment pro-
viding extraterritorial coverage under the ADEA.8 5 Congress then
established a conference committee to reconcile Senate Bill No. 2603
with the version of the bill passed by the House of Representatives. 6
Although the House amendment had no comparable extraterritorial
provision, the conference committee accepted the Senate's ADEA
amendments without any changes, thereby approving the extraterrito-
rial provision embodied in Senate Bill No. 2603.87 The conference
committee noted that it had "taken the unusual step of considering
these minor amendments within this reauthorization because of the late-
ness of the session."8 8 On September 26, 1984, the House and Senate
§ 216(d) (1982). Section 13(f) in turn provides that the conduct covered by FLSA
shall not apply "to any employee whose services during the work-week are performed
in a workplace within a foreign country...." Id. § 213(o. A fortiori, the ADEA does
not apply to overseas conduct; if Congress had intended the ADEA to apply abroad,
the above-mentioned FLSA provisions would not have appeared in the ADEA. The
Supreme Court adopted this line of reasoning in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581(1978) ("[Wjhere, as here, Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a
prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the inter-
pretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.
That presumption is particularly appropriate here since, in enacting the ADEA, Con-
gress exhibited both a detailed knowledge of the FLSA provisions and their judicial
interpretation and a willingness to depart from those provisions regarded as undesir-
able or inappropriate for incorporation."). See, e.g., DeYoreo v. Bell Helicopter Tex-
tron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1986); Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 755
F.2d 554, 555-56 (7th Cir. 1985); Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827,
828-29 (10th Cir. 1984); Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 608-09 (3d
Cir. 1984).
83. 129 CONG. RE c. S17,018 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983). The Senate had con-
ducted hearings on the issue of age discrimination against overseas Americans before
Senator Grassley introduced S.2167. See Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans,
1983: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 29-30 (1983) [hereinafter Hearing on Overseas Ameri-
cans]. The Senate, however, did not hold hearings on Senate Bill No. 2167 or issue a
report on this bill.
84. 130 CONG. REC. S4962 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1984).
85. 130 CONG. REc. S6539 (daily ed. May 24, 1984).
86. 130 CONG. REc. S510,546-51 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984) (presentation of the
House bill, disagreement over its substance, and a successful motion to establish a
conference committee).
87. 130 CONG. REc. H9805 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984).
88. H.R. REP. No. 1037, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 130 CONG. REC.
H9792, H9805 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 467,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984).
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adopted the Conference Report.89 On October 9, 1984, the President
signed Senate Bill No. 2603 into law as Public Law No. 98-459.9o
The amendments enacted by Congress and signed by President
Reagan add the following language to the ADEA definition of employee:
"The term 'employee' incudes any individual who is a citizen of the
United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign
country." 9 1 This ADEA amendment covers two classes of employers:
U.S. citizens or entities incorporated in the United States,9 2 and foreign
nationals or corporations controlled by U.S. interests. 93
B. The ADEA Amendment as a Legislative Mistake
Strong evidence indicates that the 1984 ADEA amendment was a legisla-
tive mistake. First, the amendment's sponsor, Senator Grassley, appar-
ently misled Congress as to the legislative and judicial background of
the perceived problem. Senator Grassley argued that, for economic rea-
sons inapplicable to the ADEA, the FLSA had been restricted to domes-
tic application. This argument strongly mischaracterized the FLSA's
legislative history. The Senator also misconstrued judicial holdings
regarding extraterritorial application of Title VII, thereby suggesting an
anomalous disparity between the two laws. Second, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) has failed to issue regula-
tions under the ADEA, suggesting that expanding the ADEA's
application extraterritorially was unnecessary to remedy the potential
problem concerning Congress.
1. Misrepresentation of Prior Congressional Intent
Senator Grassley misrepresented the congressional intent of the FLSA
when he introduced the 1984 ADEA amendment. Grassley argued that,
although "Congress specified that the FLSA should not apply abroad for
economic reasons ... [the] same economic considerations do not apply
to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act." 9 4 This contention is
incorrect. As outlined in a Senate report on the 1957 amendment to the
FLSA, Congress had much broader reasons than Grassley indicated for
not extending the FLSA. The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
89. 130 CONG. REC. Si1,858-66, H10340-52 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984) (Senate
agreed to the conference report by voice vote, with the House agreeing to the confer-
ence report by a 393 to 2 vote).
90. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1476-77 (Oct. 9, 1984). Interestingly, when
President Reagan signed the bill, he did not mention anything about the extraterrito-
rial coverage of the amendment.
91. Older Americans Act Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a), 98
Stat. 1767, 1792.
92. Implied by 29 U.S.C. §§ 630 (a), (b), and (h) when read together.
93. Older Americans Act Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(g)(I),
98 Stat. 1767, 1792.
94. 129 CONG. REc. S17,018 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (statement of Senator
Grassley). Senator Grassley further argued that "[i]t would be incongruous to
require companies operating abroad to pay higher American wage scales in countries
where local workers are paid pennies an hour." Id.
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noted that, in addition to disrupting foreign local economies, extraterri-
torial application of the FLSA would raise delicate questions of interna-
tional relations, affect U.S. treaties and executive agreements, and
expose defense contractors to dual legal standards.9 5 The report
reflected the opinion of Congress that extraterritorial application of U.S.
labor laws "tends to raise difficult questions of sovereignty and offends
the political sensitivities of the foreign governments concerned." 9 6 The
economic factors cited by Senator Grassley, therefore, appear peripheral
at best.9 7
2. Misrepresentation ofJudicial Authority
Senator Grassley incorrectly contended that an undesirable discrepancy
existed between the substantive rights granted by Title VII and the
ADEA. He said that "the substantive prohibitions of the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act are worded nearly exactly as those in Title
VIi, which at least two district courts have held does apply abroad."9 8
Grassley, therefore, believed the ADEA should follow Title VII in being
applied extraterritorially. Grassley, however, based his argument on
two judicial opinions with little precedential value, Love v. Pullman Co. 9 9
and Bryant v. International Schools Services, Inc. 10 0 Love v.Pullman, for
instance, is not even officially reported.1 0 ' Bryant's credibility is even
more seriously diminished since the Third Circuit questioned its reason-
ing in Cleary v. United States Lines.10 2 There the court refused to read
language into the ADEA by inference, following instead the Supreme
Court's lead in using the FLSA, not Title VII, as the basis for construing
Congress' intent. 10 3
95. S. REP. No. 987, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1756, 1757-58.
96. Id. at 1757.
97. One spokesman described the economic concerns this way: "The wages to be
paid foreign nationals, hours of employment, and all such related matters are arrived
at through negotiations with the host government ... It has been the practice of
foreign governments to insist that local standards of employment shall govern." Let-
ter of R.Y. McElroy, Captain, USN, Deputy Chief, Office of Legislative Liaison, to
Committee on Education and Labor, House of Representatives, July 15, 1957,
reprinted in 103 CONG. REc. 11,730 (1957).
98. 129 CONG. REc. S17,018 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (statement of Senator
Grassley).
99. 13 F.E.P. Cases 423, 12 E.P.D. § 11,225 (D. Colo. 1976).
100. 502 F.Supp. 472 (D. N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds , 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir.
1982) (construing Title VII as protecting Americans working outside the United
States from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin).
101. See Kirscher, supra note 76, at 399. The author notes that "[t]he Bryant court
bolstered this assertion [of extraterritoriality] with dicta from Love v. Pullman, an
unofficially reported federal district court case." Id. at 399.
102. 728 F.2d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 1984).
103. Id. at 609-10. The Supreme Court in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86
(1973), drew a different inference from the identical Title VII language. The Court
reasoned that by exempting "aliens outside of any state," congressional intent was to
include aliens inside the United States within the Act's coverage. Id. at 95. The
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Senator Grassley also believed that the Cleary and Zahourek v. Arthur
Young and Co. 10 4 decisions created a loophole in the ADEA.10 5 Grassley
quoted the Cleary opinion to argue that "deny[ing] extraterritorial effect
to the age discrimination laws would invite an employer to transfer an
older employee to a foreign subsidiary or branch as a subterfuge and
then terminate his services in violation of the statute."10 6 In other
words, Grassley contended that the two decisions permitted U.S.-based
multinational corporations to "ship and fire."' 0 7 This contention is
without merit, for the EEOC has noted that such a scheme would violate
the ADEA, even in its unamended form. 10 8 Mr. Clarence Thomas, the
Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, told the
Senate Subcommittee on Aging that: "[The EEOC] believe[s] that if an
employer intentionally transfers an employee to a foreign operation for
the purpose of evading the provisions of ADEA, we would consider that
kind of activity a violation of the Act as it is presently written."' 10 9
Finally, the ADEA as amended contains an inconsistency that sug-
gests Congress drafted the amendment either carelessly or in haste.
The 1984 amendment refers to provisions in the FLSA prohibiting
extraterritorial coverage.1 0 The amendment, however, did not repeal
the FLSA's geographic limitation provision, used by the Cleary and
Zahourek courts."'
3. Lack of Regulatory Activity
The EEOC is the agency charged with issuing and monitoring compli-
ance with the ADEA. Three years after the amendment's effective date,
the EEOC has neither promulgated nor proposed rules to regulate over-
Cleary court, however, cited the guidelines for interpretation of legislation set forth
by the Supreme Court in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-82 (1978), which held
that Congress clearly intended to incorporate the FLSA provisions against extraterri-
toriality into the ADEA because it had been selective about the provisions that would
not be incorporated. See supra note 87.
104. 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984) (the ADEA held not to apply to the termination
of employment of an American citizen by an American employer where the "work
place" was Honduras).
105. Hearings on Overseas Americans, supra note 83, at 1-2.
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at 2. Dennis Dowdell, counsel for American Can Company, responded to
Senator Grassley's claim of the newly created "ship and fire" scheme. He stated that
"American Can Company does not intend to transfer older employees to foreign
countries as a pretext for discharging them. The economic, social, and legal realities
of operating a business preclude such pretextual personnel policies and practices."
Id. at 33-37.
108. Id. at 6.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
111. Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984); Zahourek v.
Arthur Young & Co., 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984); see also DeYoreo v. Bell Helicop-
ter Textron, Inc., 785 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1986); Pfeiffer v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., 755
F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1983).
Cornell International Law Journal
seas conduct pursuant to the ADEA. 1 12 The Chairman of the EEOC
wanted the amendment to "indicate under what circumstances we are to
become involved in the area of discriminatory termination of older
employees." l3 One can therefore infer that the EEOC has not been
given a clear enough statement of Congress' policy to begin to fix the
perceived problem.
III. International Implications
A. Reactions of the World Community to the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Laws
Prior U.S. attempts to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction have created
international tension and diplomatic embarrassment stemming from
other nations' retaliatory actions. Extraterritorial application of the
ADEA may subject the United States to similar international criticism.
Other countries have resisted the export of U.S. regulatory require-
ments in three ways: political and economic retaliation, statutory meas-
ures, and diplomatic protest." 1 4
1. Political and Economic Retaliation
Other nations' political and economic retaliation consists primarily of
threats to U.S. corporations."i 5 The United States often triggers these
threats by imposing sanctions upon its major trading partners. For
example, the United States threatened Italy with sanctions as part of
U.S. opposition to the Soviet trans-Siberian pipeline. Italy, in turn,
premised Alitalia's purchase of thirty McDonnell-Douglas DC-9 jets on
the recision of the U.S. sanctions. 1 6 Similar threats may arise if Ameri-
can multinational corporations try to comply with the ADEA Amend-
ment despite contrary foreign local provisions.
2. Statutoy Foiling of Extraterritorial Application
Foreign nations employ three types of retaliatory statutes to oppose U.S.
legislation applied abroad. 117 "Blocking" statutes prohibit cooperating
112. See generally Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1525-27
(1987).
113. Hearings on Overseas Americans, supra note 83, at 5.
114. See infra notes 115-52 and accompanying text.
115. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at § 4.15; see also D. ROSEN-
THAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE-THE PROB-
LEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY, at viii-ix (1982). See generally Gordon, supra note 39.
116. Zaucha, supra note 10, at 1176; see also Haight, The Swiss Watch Case, in COM-
MON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTTRrusT: OVERLAP AND CONFLICT 311 U. Rahl ed.
1970).
117. Cira, The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN.J.
INT'L L. 247, 253 (1982); Comment, Shortening the Long Arm of American AntitrustJuris-
diction: Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. REV. 213 (1982).
The Ontario Parliament enacted the first foreign blocking legislation, designed to
prevent the U.S.Justice Department from obtaining evidence in reference to investi-
gation of the Canadian news print industry. Business Records Protection Act, Ont.
Stat. ch. 10 (1947) (codified at Ont. Rev. Stat. ch. 54 (1970)).
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with U.S. legal proceedings and discovery orders.1 18 Tax havens" 19
often employ "secrecy" statutes to cancel violations of U.S. securities
regulations by foreign intermediates of U.S. actors. 120 Finally, "draw-
back" statutes deny national recognition of certain foreign judg-
ments. 12 1 In 1980, for instance, the United Kingdom passed a drawback
statute targeted at the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws.' 2 2 It permits British defendants to recover the multiple portions of
foreign multiple-damage judgments in British courts.' 23
Similar foreign statutes may hinder the extraterritorial application
of the ADEA amendment. To obtain the protection of the ADEA, a
claimant must file a charge with the EEOC. 124 The administrative
scheme vests the EEOC with the exclusive responsibility to investigate
and collect data, and no individual may bypass this requirement for
ADEA protection.' 25 An action brought by the EEOC pre-empts any
individual's right to commence a suit.1 2 6 The FLSA grants the EEOC
broad power to: "(1) investigate and gather data; (2) enter and inspect
118. See 1J. ATWoOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at § 4.17; see also Cira, supra
note 117.
119. A 1983 Senate report noted several tax secrecy havens, including Antigua,
Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cay-
man Islands, Channel Islands, Costa Rica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Hong Kong, Liberia,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Singapore, and
Switzerland. STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF SENATE COMM.
ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., CRIME AND SECREcY: THE USE
OF OFFSHORE BANKS AND COMPANIES 7 (Comm. Print 1983); see Note, Banking Secrecy
and Insider Trading: The U.S.-Swiss Memorandum of Understanding on Insider Trading, 23
VA.J. INT'L L. 605, 605 n.1 (1983) (bank secrecy laws may furnish the means for tax
evasions, securities violations, concealment of illegal profits from narcotics, black-
market, gold trading, and fraud schemes); see also Legal and Economic Impact of Foreign
Banking Procedures on the United States: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-31 (1968).
120. Swiss law, for example, forbids disclosure of any information about bank
accounts, preventing U.S. authorities from detecting certain illegal U.S. transactions
like insider trading. United States parties may use Swiss intermediaries to conceal
their activities, because Swiss law prevents these intermediaries from disclosing the
illegal activity. Note, supra note 119, at 606.
121. See, e.g., Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act 1979,
No. 13, Austl. Acts (1979), noted in Recent Development, Antitrust: Australian Restric-
tions on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 663 (1979). See generally
Nygh, The Enforcement of United States Antitrust Judgments in Australia, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 1
(1980).
122. Protection of Trading Interests Act, ch. 11, § 6 (1980), reprinted in 959 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) F-2 (April 10, 1980).
123. Id.; see Nob, Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute under
International Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1097-98 (1981).
124. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). A private claimant must first file an age discrimi-
nation charge with the EEOC. In states with statutory prohibition of age discrimina-
tion in employment, a claimant must first file with the state authorities. Id. § 633(b).
125. The Secretary of Labor transferred the powers and responsibilities under the
ADEA to the EEOC in 1979. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1978),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1155 (1982).
126. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1982). "[The right of any person to bring such action
shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Commission to enforce
the rights of such employee .. " Id.
122 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 21
establishments and records and make transcripts thereof; (3) interview
employees; (4) impose on persons subject to the Act appropriate record
keeping and reporting requirements; (5) advise employers . . . [and]
(6) subpoena witnesses and require the production of documents and
other evidence .... ,,127 The EEOC may "require by subpoena the
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such
documentary evidence relating to any matters under investigation."' 128
If the EEOC extended the FLSA enforcement provisions beyond
the territorial limits of the United States, however, the provisions would
conflict with the discovery laws of several nations. 129 A number of
countries have enacted blocking statutes that virtually outlaw foreign
discovery proceedings in Federal Trade Commission antitrust investiga-
tions.13 0 A French statute, for example, forbids the communication of
economic, commercial, industrial, financial, or technical documents to
aliens "if such communication is harmful to France." 1 3' France passed
this law in response to a federal district court's order requiring a French
corporation to produce documents pursuant to the Federal Trade
Act.' 3 2 This statute also subjects foreign government agencies, such as
127. EEOC Procedures-Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1626.15(a) (1987).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1982); see 29 C.F.R. § 1626.16(d) (1987). Criminal penalties
may be imposed against "[W]hoever shall forcibly resist, oppose, impede, intimidate
or interfere with a duly authorized representative of the [EEOC] while it is engaged
in the performance of duties." 29 U.S.C. § 629 (1982).
129. See, e.g., infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
130. See F.T.C. v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300,
1326 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Sys-
tems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM.J. CoMP. L. 745, 745-84 (1986). Professor
Gerber concluded:
The international conflict involving American extraterritorial discovery prac-
tices results from two facts. First, the procedural system in the United States
acquires information through means which tend to be more intrusive and less
carefully supervised than their foreign counterparts. And, second, the U.S.
seeks to utilize its domestic information gathering techniques with regard to
information located outside the U.S. and in so doing often violates funda-
mental concepts ofjustice in the country in which the information is sought
to be compelled.
Id. at 784.
131. Law Concerning the Communication of Documents or Information of an Eco-
nomic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial or Technical Nature to Aliens, Whether
Natural or Artificial Persons, No. 80-538 ofJuly 16, 1980, 1980J.O. 1799, reprinted in
Toms, The French Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws, 15 INT'L
L. 585, 609 (1981).
132. Article I of French Law No. 80-538 provides:
Without prejudice to international treaties or agreements, a natural person
of French nationality or customarily residing on French territory, or director,
representative, agent or official of an artificial person with headquarters or an
establishment on French territory, shall not communicate in writing, orally,
or in any other form, regardless of place, to the public authorities of another
country documents or information of an economic, commercial, industrial,
financial or technical nature where such communication is liable to threaten
France's sovereignty, security or basic economic interests or the public order,
as defined by the administering authority when necessary.
Id. art. 1.
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the EEOC, to potential criminal liability and penalties merely for
"ask[ing] for... information.., that may constitute proof with a view to
legal or administrative proceedings in another country."' 3 3 Such a stat-
ute renders extraterritorial enforcement of the ADEA impossible. Other
countries may conceivably follow suit.
3. Diplomatic Protest
Governments also have responded to U.S. extraterritorial legislation
with diplomatic protest.' 3 4 For instance, the Civil Aeronautics Board's
attempt to abrogate transnational airlines' antitrust immunity13 5 has
made objections to U.S. actions an "automatic agenda item in diplo-
matic meetings."' 3 6 In addition, several governments have intervened
in U.S. courts as amici curiae to protest the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust laws.13 7
Labor legislation can provoke equally strong reactions. One prior
attempt, though considerably more intrusive than the ADEA, illustrates
the potential problem. The Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915138 declared
it unlawful to pay a seaman wages in advance and specifically declared
the prohibition applicable "to foreign vessels while in waters of the
United States, as to vessels of the United States."' 3 9 On January 31,
1928, Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., introduced in Congress a bill
extending to foreign vessels in foreign ports the American rule prohibit-
ing the advancement of wages. 140 Senator LaFollette said that the bill
was
133. Id. Article 1(a) of French Law No. 80-538 states:
Without prejudice to international treaties or agreements and to current laws
and regulations, a person shall not ask for, seek or communicate in writing, orally, or
in any other form, documents or information of an economic, commercial, indus-
trial, financial or technical nature that may constitute proof with a view to
legal or administrative proceedings in another country or in the framework of
such proceedings.
Id. art 1(a) (emphasis added); see also F.T.C., 636 F.2d at 1326 n.147.
134. 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at § 4.15; see also Davidow, Extra-
territorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15J. WORLD TRADE L. 500, 502 (1981).
135. See CAB Order No. 78-6-78, 43 Fed. Reg. 25, 839 (1978); 1J. ATWOOD & K.
BREWSTER, supra note 44, at § 4.12 n.65.
136. 1J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 44, at § 4.15.
137. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center,
Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1963),judgment modified, 1965 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See generally Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, Participation in Antitrust Proceedings in Member Countries as
Amicus Curiae, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 863 (1977).
138. Ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164 (1915).
139. Id. § 11, 38 Stat. at 1168 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 599(e) (1982)). The
Supreme Court construed the Act not to cover advancements "when the contract and
payment were made in a foreign country where the law sanctioned such contract and
payment.... ." Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918). The Court reasoned
that "such [a] sweeping and important requirement is not found specifically made in
the statute. Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and payments a few
words would have stated that intention .... Id. at 195.
140. S. 2945, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CONG. REC. 7081 (Jan. 31, 1928).
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designed to make effective the equalization features of the so-called
LaFollette Seamen's Act, which [had] been frustrated by the decisions of
the Supreme Court, which [had] not made the payment of advanced
wages made by foreign vessels outside of territorial waters of the United
States illegal in the deduction of the advanced wages of seamen.141
The bill's purpose was to raise to the American level the wage standard
for crews of foreign vessels.
Mere introduction of this bill produced a strongly negative interna-
tional response.' 4 2 Canada,143 Denmark, t 44 Germany, 145 Great Brit-
ain, 14 6 Italy, 147 the Netherlands, 148 Norway,' 4 9 and Sweden' 50
vigorously denounced Senator LaFollette's proposal. The British
Embassy contended that the bill was
contrary to the generally accepted principles of international law [and
that the bill] appeared to seek to vary forcibly the provisions of a contract
made within British jurisdiction, and in many cases between British sub-
jects, which was perfectly valid under British law, and apparently pur-
ported to regulate the manner in which the master of a British ship may
engage a British crew in a British port.'
5
'
Although introduced and re-introduced over a four-year period, the bill
failed to attain sufficient congressional support.'
5 2
B. Conflict with FCN Treaties
The exportation of labor standards is also inconsistent with the spirit of
U.S. bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN
treaties).' 5 3 FCN treaties ensure U.S. citizens and entities treatment
equal to that afforded nationals of the host country or at least treatment
equal to citizens and enterprises of other nations located within the host
141. 69 CONG. REC. 7080-81 (Apr. 24, 1928) (statement of Sen. LaFollette) ("The
bill was reported to the Senate without amendment, ordered to be engrossed for a
third reading, read the third time, and passed.").
142. See 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 830-38 (1928); 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 1005-09 (1929);
1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 808-14 (1931); 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 959-60 (1932).
143. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 808, 810 (1931) (aide-memoire).
144. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 830, 836 (1928) (letter); 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 1005,
1008-1009 (1929) (letter).
145. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 1005, 1005-1006 (1929) (memorandum); 1 U.S. FOREIGN
REL. 808, 818 (1931) (memorandum).
146. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 830, 832 (1928) (memorandum); 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL.
1005, 1006-1007 (1929) (letter); 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 808, 808-810 and 811-814
(1931) (memoranda); I U.S. FOREIGN REL. 959, 959-60 (1932) (letter).
147. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 830, 834 (1928) (memorandum).
148. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 830, 835 (1928) (letter); I U.S. FOREIGN REL. 1005, 1005
(1929) (note verbale).
149. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 1005, 1007-1008 (1929) (memorandum).
150. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 830, 834-35 (1928) (memorandum); 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL.
959, 959 and 960 (1932) (memoranda).
151. 1 U.S. FOREIGN REL. 808, 809 (1931) (letter from the British Embassy to the
United States Department of State).
152. See S. 314, 71st Cong., 1st Sess., 71 CONG. REC. 254 (Apr. 22, 1929); S. 1559,
72d Cong., Ist Sess., 75 CONG. REC. 440 (Dec. 14, 1931).
153. S. REP. No. 467, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1984).
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country.15 4 "The purpose of the [FCN] Treaties was not to give foreign
corporations greater rights than domestic companies, but instead to
assure them the right to conduct business on an equal basis without suf-
fering discrimination based on their alienage."' 55
Applying domestic labor standards abroad undermines the premise
of these treaties. The FCN treaties are "arrangements promoting mutu-
ally advantageous commercial intercourse, encouraging mutually benefi-
cial investments, and establishing mutual rights and privileges."156 Any
attempts by the United States to unilaterally apply domestic standards,
such as these embodied in the ADEA, violates this spirit of mutuality.
C. Foreign Corporations and the U.S. Control Test
The amended ADEA's definition of a U.S. corporation also may appear
imperialistic to many countries. The ADEA now provides that a U.S.
citizen or entity controlling a foreign corporation is liable for the con-
duct of that foreign corporation. Thus, the subsidiary's country of
incorporation does not matter.' 5 7
Some nations contend that "nationality" per se is properly deter-
mined by place of incorporation.15 8 William Knighton, Deputy Secre-
tary of the United Kingdom's Department of Trade, characterized the
issue of nationality and place of incorporation as follows: "[W]e believe
that it is generally accepted internationally that the nationality of a com-
pany is determined by its place of incorporation. . . . [E]ven where
nationality is a legitimate basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction, it must
remain subject to the primacy of the laws and the policies of the territo-
rial state."1 59 In contrast, the U.S. position embodied in the amended
ADEA asserts that the U.S. entity's degree of control over the foreign
corporation is the basis for liability. As in the past, conflict inevitably will
result when the ADEA is thus applied, whether or not U.S. shareholders
154. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty, Apr. 2,
1953, United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter FCN with
Japan].
155. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1982)
(female secretaries' suit against a U.S. subsidiary of a Japanese corporation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for discriminatory hiring practices is not
defeated by a U.S.-Japanese FCN treaty because the subsidiary is a U.S. company).
156. FCN with Japan, supra note 154, at 2066.
157. H.R. REP. No. 1037, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprinted in 130 CONG. REC.
H9792, H9805 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984); see also Radio & Television Broadcast Tech-
nicians v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965) (per curiam); 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982). The factors to be considered in determining control are:
(1) common ownership, (2) centralized control of labor relations policy, (3) interrela-
tion of operations, and (4) common management. Radio & Television Broadcast Techni-
cians, 380 U.S. at 256.
158. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414 reporters' note
2 (Tent. Final Draft 1985); see also Craig, Application of the Trading With the Enemy Act to
Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Reflections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 579 (1970).
159. Knighton, Britain: Blocking and Claw Back, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITO-
RIAL REACH 52, 53 (J. Lacey ed. 1983).
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wholly own the parent corporation. Such conflicts could be more severe
than the particular facts would seem to warrant, for jurisdictional dis-
putes often go to the essence of sovereignty: "One of the most sensitive
nerves of a state is its territorial sovereignty. When a foreign govern-
ment infringes that sovereignty by seeking to control the actions of cor-
porations within the state, contrary to the state's economic and foreign
affairs policies, a reaction may be expected."' 160
IV. Conclusion
Congress recently amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
making its coverage extraterritorial. Although well intended, the extra-
territorial labor provisions are not in the long-term best interests of U.S.
policy. Extraterritorial application of other U.S. laws has caused grave
foreign policy conflicts for the United States. One prior foray into extra-
territorial application of labor law also was disastrous. Although the
ADEA's extraterritorial impact so far has been negligible, and may
remain so, it is a dangerous precedent. Further extraterritorial applica-
tions of U.S. labor law are apt to prove far more disruptive. The United
States should not use labor law to impose its values on other countries.
Certainly, Congress should take any such foray only after grave consid-
eration of all implications, not in the cavalier, slipshod fashion of the
ADEA amendment.
160. Craig, supra note 158, at 597.
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